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Abstract The phenomenon of network vigilantism is
autonomously attributed to how anomalies and obscure
activities from adversaries can be tracked in real-time.
Needless to say, in today’s dynamic, virtualized, and
complex network environments, it has become undeniably
necessary for network administrators, analysts as well as
engineers to practice network vigilantism, on traffic as well
as other network events in real-time. The reason is to
understand the exact security posture of an organization’s
network environment at any given time. This is driven by
the fact that modern network environments do, not only
present new opportunities to organizations but also a dif-
ferent set of new and complex cybersecurity challenges
that need to be resolved daily. The growing size, scope,
complexity, and volume of networked devices in our
modern network environments also makes it hard even for
the most experienced network administrators to indepen-
dently provide the breadth and depth of knowledge needed
to oversee or diagnose complex network problems.
Besides, with the growing number of Cyber Security
Threats (CSTs) in the world today, many organisations
have been forced to change the way they plan, develop and
implement cybersecurity strategies as a way to reinforce
their ability to respond to cybersecurity incidents. This
paper, therefore, examines the relevance of Real-Time
Monitoring (RTM) as a supplementary security component
of vigilantism in modern network environments, more
especially for proper planning, preparedness, and mitiga-
tion in case of a cybersecurity incident. Additionally, this
paper also investigates some of the key issues and chal-
lenges surrounding the implementation of RTM for secu-
rity vigilantism in our modern network environments.
Keywords Real-time monitoring  Implementation 
Vigilantism  Cyber security  Network environments 
Issues  And challenges
1 Introduction
The world has entered an era where individuals, organi-
sations and government agencies want real-time faultless
digital transactions and services on demand [1]. This also
implies that any obstacle encountered while executing any
of these transactions must be resolved in real-time. How-
ever, in the context of modern network environments, the
challenges associated with on-demand real-time transac-
tions and services are growing by the day as systems and
networks become larger and complex [2]. This, therefore,
makes it hard even for the most experienced network
administrators to independently provide the breadth and
depth of knowledge needed to oversee or diagnose the
complex network problems that are prevalent. However,
with good Real-Time Monitoring (RTM) knowledge net-
work administrators can have constant and up to date
information needed to make informed decisions immedi-
ately as well as see any trends as they unfold.
Note that in the context of this paper the authors define
RTM as ‘‘the process of identifying or capturing data about
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2 Faculty of Science, ECU - Security Research Institute, Edith
Cowan University, Joondalup Campus, Australia
3 Cybersecurity and Networking Department, School of
Information Technology, Community College of Qatar,
Doha, Qatar
123
Int. j. inf. tecnol. (February 2021) 13(1):5–17
https://doi.org/10.1007/s41870-020-00585-8
faults, failures, performance, health and usage, slow sys-
tems among other issues that can cause organisation sys-
tems or network downtime and the continuous analysing
and evaluating of captured data to help maintain, mitigate
and optimize organisations’ systems and network
availability’’.
From this definition, one can infer that increasing net-
work visibility can help network administrators respond to
network issues quickly, improves efficiency levels, and
even give organisations the ability to spot possible system
and network problems swiftly before they impact on key
organisation transactions or services. This definition
though does not make technological assumptions based on
the modern network environment rather it has been
inclined towards the technological determinants that
cyberspace is modeled in.
As a contribution, this paper presents the importance of
RTM as a supplementary security component of
vigilantism in modern network environments. However,
the paper also explores some of the key issues and chal-
lenges surrounding the implementation of RTM for vigi-
lantism in our modern network environments. The
objective is to show how RTM can help network admin-
istrators, analysts, and engineers respond to security inci-
dents swiftly but also expose the issues and challenges
surrounding RTM implementation.
The remaining part of this paper is structured as follows:
Sect. 2 briefly presents the background followed by
research advances in Sect. 3. Section 4 covers the rele-
vance of RTM as a supplementary security component of
cyber vigilantism in modern network environments fol-
lowed by issues and challenges surrounding the imple-
mentation of RTM in Sect. 5. Key vulnerable RTM areas
in modern networked environments are discussed in
Sect. 6. Section 7 presents a critical evaluation of the
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propositions in this paper before a conclusion is made in
Sect. 8 and make mention of the future research work.
2 Related Literature
This section presents a brief background of the following
areas: the concept of a Modern Network Environment,
Cyber Security Threats, and Real-Time Monitoring.
2.1 Modern network environment (MNE)
Traditionally, a network consists of two or more computers
that are linked together to share resources, exchange files,
or allow electronic communications [3, 4]. This definition
though has evolved to accommodate new concepts that
define the modern network environment as explained in
this paper.
A Modern Network Environment (MNE) can thus be
defined as a list of many interdependent components that
include but not limited to servers, workstations, cloud
infrastructure (cloud-based technology, Virtual Machines),
instances, configurations, web applications, Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Software
Defined Networking (SDN) architectures, Internet of
Things (IoT) devices, the users and other network devices
that need to be protected but at the same time allow net-
work administrators have full visibility of their network.
Also, MNEs are widely distributed with more bandwidth
and buffering characteristics and may also include
automation of some of the network activities as well as
offer drag-and-drop interfaces. Besides, some of the mod-
ern network infrastructures are scalable, resilient, and
always on. This makes MNEs have the ability to abstract
away the need to know what vendor’s equipment is being
used hence simplifying the knowledge and expertise net-
work administrators need to have.
MNEs also consider external services and remote users
which sometimes need to be connected to the organiza-
tions’ network daily. Because of their ability to access
sensitive information and systems within the organization
network, administrators need to have continuous monitor-
ing into what these external services and users are doing,
what devices they are accessing or using, what apps are
they accessing and if they are using a virtual private net-
work (VPN) and if at all they are following the laid down
policies [5].
Despite all the technological developments, MNEs are
still susceptible to cybersecurity threats. Some of the
cybersecurity threats affecting MNE are briefly elaborate
on in the next sub-section.
2.2 Cyber security threats affecting MNEs
A Cyber Security Threat (CST) is a malicious act by an
adversary or a process that seeks to damage data, steal data,
or disrupt digital systems in general [6].The outcomes of any
CST may include but not limited to: theft of valuables,
electrical blackouts, failure of military equipment, breaches
of national security data, theft of sensitive medical data
records, disruption of phone/mobile networks, interference
with computer networks or paralyse computer systems
making data unavailable and many other potential threats to
human lives [7]. In MNEs, CSTs are relentlessly quirky,
characterized by disguise and manipulation. They constantly
evolve to find new ways to annoy, damage, or steal data,
disrupt digital systems, or even harm individuals [8][10][11].
This, therefore, raises the need for network administrators to
consider alternative ways of defending their networks. This,
scenario motivated the research in this paper to consider
RTM as a supplementary security component in modern
network environments. The sub-sections to follow briefly
explains some of the recent CSTs affecting MNEs.
2.2.1 Crypto Jacking
With the distributed nature of our MNEs coupled with the
fact that anything can be connected to something, Crypto-
jacking has emerged as an online threat or malware that
hides on a computer or mobile device and uses the
machine’s resources to ‘‘mine’’ cryptocurrencies [19].
Crypto-jacking can hijack web browsers, as well as com-
promise all kinds of devices, from desktops and laptops to
smartphones and even network servers and IoT devices.
Hackers use crypto-jacking to steal computing resources
from their victims’ devices to compete against sophisti-
cated crypto mining operations without the costly over-
head. According to [8, 9][10] this type of attack slows
down computer processes, increases electricity bills as well
as shortens the lifespan of computing devices. Hackers
mostly use malicious links in an email that loads crypto
mining code on the computer, or by infecting a website or
online advert with JavaScript code that auto executes once
loaded in the victim’s browser.
2.2.2 Ransomware
This is a form of malware targeting both human and
technical weaknesses in MNEs to make critical data and/or
systems inaccessible [12]. This type of malware is deliv-
ered through various vectors, including Remote Desktop
Protocol, which allows computers to connect across a
network, and phishing email [13] then spreads throughout
the network by installing malicious software. In most
cases, the hacker usually takes control of a computer or the
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networked device, locks its data, and demands a ransom
from the victim promising to restore access to the data
upon payment. When a compromised system is infected,
the ransomware program shows a message requiring pay-
ment for functionality restoration. The payment is normally
requested in bitcoin and is accompanied by the due date.
The attackers use bitcoin transactions because it can
anonymize the real culprit of the attack. Once the payment
is done, in some cases, the system will be restored to
normal. Unfortunately, it may not be 100% the case as
some of the systems could be lost forever.
2.2.3 Cyber-physical attacks
According to [14], a cyber-physical attack on critical
infrastructure occurs when a hacker gains access to a
computer system that operates equipment in a manufac-
turing plant, oil pipeline, a refinery, an electric generating
plant, or other similar infrastructure and can control the
operations of that equipment to damage those assets or
other property. Knowing that MNEs are dynamic and dis-
tributed, cyber-physical attacks are a risk not only for the
owners and operators of critical infrastructures, but also for
their suppliers, customers, businesses and persons in the
vicinity of the attacked infrastructure, and any person or
entity that may be adversely affected by it [14]. With
cyber-physical attacks, a hacker can disable cameras, turn
off a building’s lights, make a car veer off the road, or a
drone land in enemies’ hands among many other attacks
that can cause harm.
2.2.4 Endpoint attacks
Endpoints can be defined as points of access to an organ-
isations network which create points of entry that can be
exploited by malicious actors. This implies that an end-
point can be an IoT device, a local or remote computing
device that communicates back and forth with a network to
which it is connected to [15]. This may also include but not
limited to Point-of-sale, industrial control or fixed-function
devices, desktops, laptops, smartphones, tablets, servers,
workstations among other devices. Endpoints in the context
of MNEs are increasingly susceptible to cyberattacks thus
making it easier for intruders to get past security measures.
Endpoint security, however, is intended to protect these
devices from malicious internal and external threats. Some
of the biggest endpoint threats are phishing and ran-
somware attacks [16].
2.2.5 IoT attacks
Internet of Things (IoT) devices are a fast-growing sector
of the Internet as well as in MNEs. However, as the number
of connected devices proliferates, the increase creates
additional points of access in a network. More access
means more opportunity for unwanted entry points in the
networks. This is true of any smart building, but it is
especially worrisome in homes where everyone ought to
feel safest [17]. It’s fair to say that the proliferation and
increased and continued ubiquity of IoT ecosystems has
sparked a malicious attackers’ renaissance, as most IoT
devices require web access or mobile apps for manual
control [18]. This access, in turn, can subvert some security
developments of the past decade, exposing bugs that have
been dormant [17].
With the growing number of IoT attacks in the world,
many organisations have been forced to change the way
they plan, develop, and implement cybersecurity strategies
to reinforce their ability to respond to cybersecurity inci-
dents. Hence, the need to consider RTM as a supplemen-
tary security component in MNEs. The next sub-section
explains more about the concepts of R.
2.3 Real-time monitoring (RTM)
Real-time is a phrase mostly used to refer to the ability of a
system to respond to something swiftly so that the response
takes place almost at the same time as the event is hap-
pening [19]. For this reason, it has become very necessary
to analyse real time data in many fields to enable quick
reaction to momentary events [20]. In computer networks
for example, if a switch port reports high bandwidth uti-
lization, the network administrator will need to monitor the
live utilization statistics of that port in real-time to know
whether the problem still exists or not [21].
RTM, therefore, allows network administrators and
engineers to see and respond to network events such as
faults, failures, performance, health and usage, slow sys-
tems among other issues that can cause organisation sys-
tems or network downtime as they occur. The events data
and information help them to review and determine the
current status of network systems as well as the overall
processes and activities executed on the network data in
real-time, or as it happens. One key thing about RTM
though is that for every command given by the network
administrators the data or information returned is consid-
ered accurate as at the moment the command was issued
and helps them make up to date informed decisions and see
trends as they develop.
Some RTM tools can offer administrators with visual
insights into the data which is fetched from various sources
as well as instant notifications or alerts into specific data-
driven or administrator-specified events, such as when
some data values go out of range. Relevant data can then be
displayed according to priorities and administrator prefer-
ences on customizable interfaces using graphs, bar graphs,
8 Int. j. inf. tecnol. (February 2021) 13(1):5–17
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pie charts, or percentages [20]. Research advances in RTM
have opened new opportunities and applications in differ-
ent fields, some of which are discussed in the section to
follow.
3 Research advances in RTM
To begin with, [22] state that monitoring network statistics
is important for maintenance and infrastructure planning
for any network service provider. In this research, they
showcase an initial analysis of a general-purpose network
monitoring platform for high-speed mobile networks. They
then use their developed platform as the basis for per-
forming complex real-time analysis such as application
usage behaviour, security analysis, infrastructure planning
[22]. This research was well articulated however, it did not
focus on the importance of RTM as a supplementary
security component of vigilantism in MNEs as is the case
of this paper.
In another research by Sultana and Jairam [23] argue
that networks are growing extensively and managing huge
networks is utterly challenging. Besides, they state that
monitoring networks form an important part of network
management which assists in visualization of the network
behaviour in real-time. For this reason, they present in their
study a few network monitoring approaches as well as
various applications of network monitoring. Their
approach, however, was also not geared towards the
importance of RTM as a supplementary security compo-
nent of vigilantism in MNEs [24] also highlighted in their
study that, monitoring is an important concept in network
management as it helps network operators to determine the
behaviour of a network and the status of its components.
They also state that Software-defined networking (SDN) is
becoming increasingly popular for network provision and
management tasks. It is on these grounds that they survey
the tasks and challenges associated with SDN, providing an
overview of SDN monitoring developments. Their research
was purely based on SDN and not on RTM as a supple-
mentary security component in MNEs.
More research by [25] proposes the development and
implementation of better network monitoring solutions
using SDN technologies. This was backed up by the fact
that, as the complexity of the networks grows, the
requirements for better network monitoring increase, and
the traditional tools for network monitoring cannot meet
these new challenges.
Another effort by [26] proposed an SDN-Monitor,
which carefully selects switches to monitor to reduce
resource consumption. Their research assumed that, with
growing services running in clouds, it is critical to
defending the services from Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attacks. For this reason, they argue that SDN
provides a flexible platform for network monitoring and
relies on a central controller to ask switches for traffic
statistics to get global traffic visibility for security.
There also exist other research works on RTM, however,
neither those nor the cited references in this paper have
presented insights on RTM as a supplementary security
component of vigilantism in MNEs in the way that is
discussed in this paper. However, we acknowledge the fact
that the previous research works on RTM have offered
useful insights toward the presentation in this paper. In the
section that follows, we explain the importance or rele-
vance of RTM as a supplementary security component of
vigilantism in MNEs which forms the first part of the
contribution in this paper.
Fig. 1 Agent in Modern learning Environment
Int. j. inf. tecnol. (February 2021) 13(1):5–17 9
123
4 Relevance of RTM as a supplementary security
component of cyber vigilantism in MNEs
RTM has slowly become a key component of many
organisations’ networks. To understand the importance or
relevance of RTM as a supplementary security component
of cyber vigilantism in MNEs, this section digs deeper into
revealing what value can an organisation obtain by con-
sidering RTM in its MNEs. Note that the list presented in
this section has only what the authors randomly selected
from documents and Literature surveys and deemed rele-
vant to this study and does not in any way form a complete
and comprehensive list. To begin with, Fig. 1 shows the
need to have a real-time agent in modern network envi-
ronments so that it can learn the changing nature of net-
works, which in turn can help in real-time monitoring.
Figure 1 shows a concept of a real-time agent deployed
in a modern network environment that helps to learn the
complexity of the environment concerning knowledge-
based, behaviour-based and rule-based approaches and
forward all that which is learned or the security events in a
database based on real-time monitoring. An analysis of the
data stored in the database can easily be presented in the
form of reports. From this concept, many important and
relevant features can be extracted that present new oppor-
tunities of interest to different organisations hence con-
tributing to the relevance of RTM in the modern network
environment. The list in the sub-sections to follow briefly
explain the identified areas of relevance to this study with
respect to RTM.
4.1 Centralized view of the network infrastructure
With the help of RTM tools in MNEs, irrespective of the
networking devices and vendors, the underlying network
infrastructure can be abstracted from many applications
hence allowing the network administrators to have a single
centralized view of everything that is happening in the
network. Too many devices and applications without a
centralized view can create problems in ways both big and
small which could end up with network outages that cannot
be traced quickly enough, cybersecurity risks, or even other
compliance issues. However, when administrators can
visualize the entire network in real-time from the port level
to applications, then they can create significant savings in
money, time, and other inconveniences as well.
4.2 Enhance efficiency: saving on time
and resources
Traditionally some organisations use an old strategy that
involves ‘‘run until it breaks’’ [27]. This strategy is based
on reactive maintenance and only addressing things or
events that are causing an active disruption into the net-
work. Besides, this strategy can increase the cost expo-
nentially. RTM, on the other hand, can help save the time
needed by network administrators to manually inspect
systems and devices for faults or noncompliance by
automating the whole process which also reduces the
incidence of human error thus lower costs. Setting priori-
ties can also ensure that critical areas with high risks in
MNEs can be addressed before they create more high-cost
problems in the network.
4.3 Increased productivity
RTM can help keep an eye on all activities taking place in
an organisations network environment through automation
hence serving to prevent unauthorized transactions or ser-
vices by identifying them quickly and responding to them
swiftly. This implementation in MNEs, therefore, min-
imises the risks of network downtime giving the network
administrators more time to complete other assigned tasks
on time hence increasing productivity in the organisation.
For people working from remote locations, they can get
more work done with access to real-time information than
when they must make un-ending calls to the organisation
which also takes a lot of time to resolve some simple tasks.
4.4 Quick identification and detection of potential
security vulnerabilities and threats
Effectively implementation and utilization of RTM can
help identify and detect potential security vulnerabilities
and threats. This is because RTM can quickly and effi-
ciently help locate most of the problem’s source, correlate
data, and enable the organisation to swiftly mitigate a
problem. Security breaches can cost an organisation a lot of
money, but with good RTM one can improve reliability
and lower overall support and ongoing maintenance costs.
Vulnerability assessment and threat detection in MNEs is
one of the greatest reasons for implementing RTM in many
organisations.
4.5 Strengthen security controls
MNEs are larger and complex with virtualization being
introduced in some organisation. Each new component
added to the network means more security controls are
needed to be implemented and tracked. Manually tracking
or monitoring and analysing security controls can be both
inefficient and inaccurate. With today’s complex and
hybrid network environments, having RTM in place can
help strengthen security controls, keep up with organisa-
tions risk monitoring and compliance audits. This also
10 Int. j. inf. tecnol. (February 2021) 13(1):5–17
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means that organizations can streamline auditing and
quickly respond to unauthorized transactions with ease.
With RTM one can also integrate detective controls, pre-
ventive controls as well as reactive controls. According to
[28], detective controls to monitor and compare access and
permissions against actual network usage to ensure that
monitored activities align with the authorizations granted.
Preventive controls, on the other hand, examine policies
and peer groups to determine if a problem could potentially
arise. If an inconsistency is detected, then reactive controls
take over and send alerts to notify the appropriate admin-
istrators so the issue can be corrected in real-time, before it
becomes a larger risk to the organization.
4.6 Prevent data loss and data leakage
Data loss refers to an event in which important organisation
data is lost while Data Loss Prevention (DLP) focuses on
preventing unauthorized access, misuse, and illicit transfer
of data outside organizational boundaries [29] DLP offers
insight into where data lives and appropriately secures it
besides showing real-time controls to detect violations of
the data.
With DLP, RTM can be used to monitor organisations
data and send an alert about attacker attempts to access any
sensitive data as well as to detect and correlate network
events that might constitute data leakage. This may also
include automatically blocking any actions that violate the
organisations security policies, data encryption and other
protective actions to prevent end-users from accidentally or
maliciously sharing data that could put the organization at
risk [30]. Besides, it should also be possible to monitor
access to all sensitive files and recording granular usage
data such as user, department, file accessed, file type, and
operation response time [29].
4.7 Optimize network performance
Network optimization is the process of making the best or
most effective use of network resources in such a way that
the network achieves maximum productivity with mini-
mum wasted effort or expense for a given environment.
Good implementation of RTM can give network adminis-
trators valuable insights into the organisation network’s
operation thus help them to manage bandwidth utilization,
minimize latency, packet loss, congestion, and jitter.
Optimizing network performance in MNEs can help
observe the network performance and then create cus-
tomized traffic models which in turn can improve the
overall productivity.
4.8 Track network services functionality
With so many network services running on countless
devices with different features and capabilities in MNEs, it
can be overwhelming to manually monitor all of them.
However, with the help of RTM, network services offered
using different protocols such as SMTP, POP3, HTTP,
TCP/IP, FTP among others can be monitored with ease
thus giving the network administrator an easy way to track
every single network service functionality.
4.9 Continually improve operations
With modern, dynamic, and complex network environ-
ments coupled with the increased cybersecurity threats,
continually improving network operations is usually an
effort of most network administrators. This helps to
improve the functionalities and services offered by the
organisations’ network and deliver efficiency, effective-
ness, and flexibility. However, this can also improve net-
work quality, reduced network maintenance costs,
simplified work processes, less waste of network resources,
and improved service delivery. RTM can thus be used to
monitor network operation and performance remotely and
identify violations in real-time for fast remediation, which
include but not limited to network security update services.
4.10 Understand the impact of any new changes
Whenever a new thing is introduced into the organisation
network, there is always bound to be an impact. With real-
time data analysis, administrators do not only get a com-
plete picture of all the activities in a network but also are
alerted of any changes or developments as they unfold.
This helps them to address any problem promptly.
Whichever the scenario, understanding the impact of any
new changes in MNEs enables network administrators to
quickly and accurately respond to critical issues or requests
such as those that impact areas touching on healthcare data,
automotive, and aerospace industry.
4.11 Monitor compliance and regulations
It is now becoming almost a must for all organisations to
apply the requirements of compliance regulations and
standards in all areas of business including the imple-
mentation of the Information Security Management System
(ISMS) Framework. However, with many industries and
government regulations coming into play, regulatory
compliance obligations are becoming a challenge to many
organisations, even more, challenging to those organisa-
tions operating in multiple geographic locations and with
lots of staff members. For this reason, a simplified way to
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help organisation systems and networks adhere to regula-
tory compliance obligations could be the use of RTM and
reporting tools to alerts organisations in real-time of any
compliance policy violations. RTM can also be used to
monitor certain issues such as network security and log
management requirements imposed by many statutory and
regulatory auditing authorities hence avoiding any com-
pliance breach.
4.12 Achieve digital forensic readiness
The readiness of an organization towards addressing digital
forensics is a major drive in this current technology driven
organizational workspace. Accordingly, studies [31, 32],
have examined workplace readiness as the ability of an
organisation to maximise its potential to use digital evi-
dence whilst minimising the costs of an investigation.
Good RTM of network events and gathering of potential
evidence for forensic purposes can make the digital
forensic investigation process much easier and faster. This
is because digital forensic readiness allows an organisation
to be properly prepared to handle security incidents and
avoid damage and unnecessary costs [33, 34]. It is now
becoming important to have forensic readiness in MNEs.
Having looked at the relevance of RTM, the section that
follows discuss the issues and challenges surrounding the
implementation of RTM in any given MNEs. A depictive
summary of the relevance of RTM as a potentially com-
plementary component in NME is further presented in
Fig. 2.
5 Issues and challenges surrounding
the implementation of RTM
As good as the idea of having RTM implemented in one’s
organisation may sound, it has its own issues and chal-
lenges that organisations must battle with. Some of these
challenges are briefly explained in the sub-section to
follow.
5.1 Cost of hardware and software
Knowing that MNEs are dynamic, distributed, and com-
plex, implementing RTM can be costly especially for small
organisations. The hardware or software requirements may
be prohibitively beyond reach to many small organisations.
Besides, the maintenance and upgrading costs may also be
too high for some organisations. With existing network
environments integration may also not be simple hence
adding up to the cost factor challenge to a different
organisation.
5.2 Systems integration challenges
If all organisation were to use the same infrastructure and
architecture in the world then systems integration would
not be so much of an issue or a challenge. Unfortunately,
this is not the case for many organisations in the world.
Introducing new tools and technology in MNEs must be
done with caution to avoid corrupting existing network
environments and ensure future changes are taken into
consideration. Different network topologies and architec-
ture including different device vendors pause a huge inte-
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Fig. 2 Overview of the Relevance of RTM in NME
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5.3 The traceability of an application challenge
Traceability of an application in MNEs can be very tricky
as it involves the capability to trace an application running
in your network, its history and its location, and the ability
to chronologically interrelate uniquely identifiable entities
related to the application in a way that everything is veri-
fiable [35]. A lot of research needs to be done in this area as
this is one of the open challenges and problems in MNEs.
5.4 Lack of a cross-domain solution challenge
Complex interconnected systems are now present in
MNEs. This, therefore, means that any organisation seek-
ing to update or expand data and information-sharing
capabilities in their networks must be able to do so without
introducing security vulnerabilities to network. However,
this is a big challenge as many vendors do not consider
cross-domain solutions during hardware manufacture or
software development. In an ideal situation Cross Domain
Solution (CDS) technologies are meant to enable organi-
sations to share data and information across physically,
logically, and administratively separated networks in a
reliable, secure, and interoperable manner. However, CDS
creates a big challenge as different networks may have
different security policies to address their exposure to
different types of threats and levels of risk, and therefore
hold differing levels of trust [36].
5.5 Summary of challenges to RTM implementation
The discussed challenges to the implementation of an RTM
in a typical MNE is further summarized in Fig. 1. The
RTM can indeed provide a baseline for the mitigation of
the potential threats to the MNE. However, the diverse
threat actors within the threat landscape tend to attack the
process of MNE integration. Given that the effectiveness of
a typical RTM is dependent on the integration-capability of
the environment, potential threat actors are, therefore,
capable of limiting the implementation of the RTM. This is
further illustrated in Fig. 3.
One common challenge to the RTM implementation is
the semantics between the individual challenges. For
instance, the challenge of the lack of traceability of
application can be attributed to two other challenges (ob-
structive evidence gathering, and the lack of cross-domain
solution). These dependent challenges are also the conse-
quence of other challenges as indicated in Fig. 3. This,
therefore, implies that an attempt to provide an effective
RTM within the current architecture of most MNE would
require a redesign of the architectural composition of the
MNE. Besides, the inherent configurational limitation of
most devices within the MNE can further induce system
challenges.
6 Key vulnerable RTM areas in modern
networked environment
This section shows the key vulnerable RTM areas in MNEs
that could cause attacks and respective security violations.
However, possible approaches that could be used to
enforce RTM are also discussed as is shown in Table 1.
The key areas that have been considered represent the
vulnerability brought by interconnected modern infras-
tructures that are susceptible to random attacks. Given the
topology of the network and the ever-changing infrastruc-
ture, it is the authors’ opinion that key areas that are
Fig. 3 Perspective of Threat actors and the semantic composition of Challenges
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affected by these attacks could easily be mitigated. In
SCADA, for example, the authors have identified buffer
overflow and SQL injection attacks that violate integrity
(tampering with acquired data), availability, and confi-
dentiality. To mitigate these kinds of attacks using RTM,
some machine learning techniques that can statistically
analyse these data to detect anomalies can be deployed.
Others include Cyber-physical systems that can suffer from
physical and DDoS attacks thus violating Confidentiality,
Integrity, and Availability (CIA) triad. To mitigate these
causative attacks, frequent monitoring of client–server
sessions should be enabled. Another important area that is
vulnerable is the critical infrastructure systems that can be
affected by DDoS, SQL injection, and other malware
attacks that violate availability and integrity. Based on
these attacks it is important to enforce robust and predictive
monitoring and hyper logistics [37].
Next, are IoT attacks, which have in the recent past
become more prevalent and are affected by botnet attacks,
Man in The Middle attacks (MITM), identity theft, and
Advanced Persistent Threats (APT). The security violation
in this context is geared towards the CIA triad. Approaches
to counter this include sensor instrumentation, monitoring,
and enforcing logging mechanisms.
Other relevant vulnerable environment includes Soft-
ware Defined Networking (SDN) architectures and cloud
infrastructures which normally are affected by MITM,
sensor attacks and social engineering aspects while the
cloud can be affected by DDoS and botnet attacks. While
SDN architectures and the cloud violates the CIA triad, the
cloud infrastructures can further violate privacy because of
the movement of data. Possible RTM approaches for SDN
architectures include Logging/log analysis, network
inventory, and parameter analysis of traffic [38–40].
Acquiring and calculating network parameters in real-time
[41, 42] while for the cloud can include real-time acqui-
sition of data to monitor traffic/telemonitoring systems. A
summary of the key vulnerable RTM areas in modern
networked environments is presented in Table 1 below.
Based on the key aspects that have been highlighted in
Table 1, it is important to note that the mitigation
approaches that the authors have stated are based on the
possible generic approaches that have been used to defend
the existing networked environment. While the authors do
not beforehand suggest that only these techniques should
be applied for all the malicious raids, it is imperative to
explicitly say that novel approaches for the ever-changing
environment could be used based on the prevailing sce-
nario. Based on the vulnerable areas in MNE, we rank the
network environments based on the severity (0–7) of the
security violations as is shown in Fig. 4, where 7 is the
most severe and 0 is the least severe. In this context
SCADA, CPS, IoT ECO and SDN architectures are ranked
as least severe with 3 because they violates CIA
Fig. 4 Severity of Key vulnerable areas of MNE
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respectively. Next, CIS is ranked 5 which is mild severity
for it violates integrity, physical tampering and Availability
while cloud infrastructures are ranked as 7 because they
violate CIAA and privacy.
Having looked at the key vulnerable areas, the next
section provides a contextual critical evaluation.
7 Critical evaluation of the propositions
A discussion of the suggestions and propositions that have
been put forward in this paper is given from a contextual
approach in this section. To effectively monitor MNEs, it is
paramount to identify key indicators and security events
that are contained in the network infrastructure. Of
importance in the MNEs is the schema that can be used in
the analysis of security events that may affect the operation
or the normal running of the networked environment. This,
in the long run, may hinder the vigilantism that may help to
avert adversarial behaviour. RTM involves, secure moni-
toring and logging of events, even though sometimes this
may be done remotely in some instances. It is important
when a correlation between what is conducted remotely
and in real-time is mapped in the most effective way
possible through dynamic reporting as was previously
shown in Fig. 1. Consequently, numerous activities could
be monitored and some of these activities may be denoted
as key indicators or beacons that if attacked by adversaries
may hinder the full operation of the network infrastructure.
Also, it is important to note that important infrastructure
supporting cyber-physical systems like SCADA networks
may need real-time agents to be deployed so that they can
learn the environment in an intrusion detection approach
which utilises machine learning approaches to detect more
sophisticated attacks.
In the context of this research, the key aspects that need
to be monitored range from anomaly detection, real-time
threat detection, and other attacks like integrity attacks and
sensor-based attacks as is highlighted by [18]. That
notwithstanding, most of the current networks have
become indispensable and very open to quite a large and
increasing number of adversaries. It is imperative to also
note that the amount of data that in the recent past is being
generated in these networks is massive and this is one of
the important factors that necessitate RTM.
Because it is easy for adversaries to camouflage them-
selves while data is being exchanged, more resilient
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) should be developed
that can address the aforementioned painstaking chal-
lenges. The point of concertation in the past has always
been to gain physical access to router and firewall logs.
However, computing has shifted currently to the edge, and
data is handled in a fog-based approach. Mostly, it
becomes useful to access these data in real-time as they
move across the edge hence the need for Adhoc networking
infrastructure to monitor the data while profiling adver-
saries at the same time. it is also important to check the
integrity, confidentiality, and privacy of these data while
conducting real-time monitoring. The authors would like to
emphasize that a key solution of uncovering and ensuring
that the causative attacks that have been mentioned in
Table 1 are dealt with, is to employ advanced anomaly
detection techniques because the complexity of these
attacks changes overnight rendering the network architec-
tures to be exposed to adversaries. Modern advanced
machine learning approaches can help one detect malicious
activities with some degree of accuracy. Another important
aspect worth exploring is network traffic, which at the time
of writing this paper is still a contentious issue.
Contemporary techniques of analysing traffic in real-
time have not addressed key challenges, i.e. Real-time
forensic analysis of data has been proposed as a technique
of conducting forensic logging and extracting digital data
to see if a potential security incident could be detected in
real-time [44–48]. Regardless of this, a suggestion by the
authors is to adopt approaches that are more intelligent,
knowledge-based and takes care of the behaviour of the
network environment as shown by the agent-based
approach in Fig. 1. By deploying such an agent, it could
easily map the analysed traffic to possible vulnerabilities,
while taking into consideration the amount of traffic at the
disposal. The advantage of employing the approach shown
in Fig. 1 is that the degree of identifying specific or known
attacks, when an incident is detected may be used to
develop approaches that exhibit some behaviour, which in
the long run is a step toward attack detection.
Because of the foregoing, the authors posit that it is
imperative to enforce RTM as a supplementary approach,
and identifying the key security events in a network envi-
ronment should be a point of concern. The data is the key
player coupled with robust and more current attack tech-
niques. While this paper has tried to present the network-
ing, environment based on modern cross-cutting and more
proliferated environments, it is also important to emphasize
that RTM may well be enforced with agents that can
interact and learn about the environment. Knowing that the
cyber-space has become complicated and not easy to reg-
ulate, monitoring it needs real-time approaches. Therefore,
if agents are trained to execute this task in real-time to
understand the topology of the network infrastructure, then
cyber-vigilantism could to some degree be enforced.
Whilst diverse variations of RTM is currently implemented
in most endpoint intrusion detection and response (EDR)
system, the logic of an intelligent cyber-vigilantism pre-
sents a next-generation capability for the existing EDRs.
Thus, the Authors would suggest a study in this direction,
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as a potential to harness the capability presented by the
EDR and the intelligent cyber-vigilantism. Such a future
direction should, however, not be limited to only EDR, as
diverse RTM could leverage this integration.
8 Conclusion and future work
To this end, in addition to firewalls and virus scanners,
other measures such as encoding software, data security
software, content filters, port scanners, and other tools
organisations need a good and comprehensive RTM
approach. This paper highlighted the importance of Real-
Time Monitoring as a Supplementary Security Component
of vigilantism in Modern Network Environments. This,
therefore, means that to enhance security in MNEs, RTM
can play an important part in enhancing modern security
measures. However, this paper also investigates some of
the different key issues and challenges surrounding the
implementation of RTM in MNEs and the key vulnerable
areas. It is in the authors’ opinion that this information will
trigger more discussion and research into the field of Real-
Time Monitoring in Modern Network Environments.
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References
1. John H (2019). What will 2019 bring to the on-demand services
economy? Available at: https://medium.com/@jhrzic/what-will-
2019-bring-to-the-on-demand-services-economy-c99de54bc6a7
[Accessed on 10th October 2019]
2. Reichenbach M (2004) New challenges in electronic payments.
Book chapter appears in the book, intelligent enterprises of the
21st Century, edited by Jatinder Gupta and Sushil Sharma.
Copyright  2004, Idea Group Inc.
3. Adeyemi IR, Razak SA, Azhan NAN (2013) A review of current
research in network forensic analysis. Int J Digit Crime Foren
5(1):1–26
4. Roy W., (2013) What is a network? Avaialable at: https://fcit.usf.
edu/network/chap1/chap1.htm [Accessed on 10th October 2019]
5. Justin B (2019) How to gain security visibility into a modern
environment. Available at: https://blog.rapid7.com/2019/03/27/
how-to-gain-security-visibility-into-a-modern-environment/ [Ac-
cessed on 10th October 2019]
6. Taylor H (2018) What are cyber threats. Available at: https://
preyproject.com/blog/en/what-are-cyber-threats-how-they-affect-
you-what-to-do-about-them/ [Accessed on 30th August 2019]
7. Karie NM, Nor Masri Sahri (2019) Real time monitoring of cyber
security threats: a state of the art. (in Press - CRC Horizon Scan
Report 2019)
8. Webroot (2019) Types of computer security threats and how to
avoid them. Available at: https://www.webroot.com/au/en/
resources/tips-articles/computer-security-threats [Accessed on
2nd September 2019]
9. Malwarebytes (2019) Cryptojacking. Available at: https://www.
malwarebytes.com/cryptojacking/ [Accessed on 6th September
2019]
10. Singh A, Ikuesan AR, Venter HS (2019) Digital forensic readi-
ness framework for ransomware investigation. In: Breitinger F,
Baggili I (eds) Lecture notes of the institute for computer sci-
ences, social-informatics and telecommunications engineering,
LNICST. Springer International Publishing, Cham, pp 91–105
11. Singh A, Adeyemi I, Hein V (2019b) A context-aware trigger
mechanism for ransomware forensics. In: 14th international
conference on cyber warfare and security, ICCWS 2019, 629–38.
12. Gartner, Inc (2018) Gartner forecasts worldwide information
security spending to exceed $124 Billion in 2019. Available at:
https://www.gartner.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2018-08-
15-gartner-forecasts-worldwide-information-security-spending-
to-exceed-124-bilManageEngine, (2019). lion-in-2019 [Accessed
on 4th September 2019]
13. Newman LH (2018) Github survived the biggest DDoS attack
ever recorded, November 2018. [Online]. Available: https://
www.wired.com/story/github-ddos-memcached/ [Accessed on
16th September 2019]
14. Scheuermann JE (2017) Cyber-physical attacks on critical
infrastructure: what’s keeping your insurer awake at night?
Available at: http://www.klgates.com/cyber-physical-attacks-on-
critical-infrastructure–whats-keeping-your-insurer-awake-at-
night-01-24-2017/ [Accessed on 9th September 2019]
15. Paloalto (2019) What is an endpoint? Available at: https://www.
paloaltonetworks.com/cyberpedia/what-is-an-endpoint [Accessed
on 10th September 2019]
16. Secureworks (2019) 2019 Endpoint guide: threats, security,
management, and protection. Available at: https://www.secure
works.com/blog/endpoint-security-guide-management-protec
tion-detection [Accessed on 10th September 2019]
17. Robinson S (2019) Smart home attacks are a reality, even as the
smart home market soars. Available at: https://www.cisco.com/c/
en/us/solutions/internet-of-things/smart-home-attacks.html [Ac-
cessed on 10th September 2019]
18. Kebande VR, Bugeja J, Persson JA (2019) Internet of threats
introspection in dynamic intelligent virtual sensing. In: 9th
Conference on Internet of Things, Bilbao, Spain.
19. Cengage (2019) Real–time monitoring and reporting. Available
at: https://www.encyclopedia.com/environment/energy-govern
ment-and-defense-magazines/real-time-monitoring-and-reporting
[Accessed on 11th October 2019]
20. Rouse M (2017) Real-time monitoring. Available at: https://
whatis.techtarget.com/definition/real-time-monitoring [Accessed
on 11th October 2019]
21. ManageEngine (2019) Real-time network monitoring. Available
at: https://www.manageengine.com/network-monitoring/real-
time-network-monitoring.html [Accessed on 11th October 2019]
22. Kurt B, Zeydan E, Yabas U, Karatepe I, Karabulut Kurt G,
Cemgil A (2016) A network monitoring system for high speed
network traffic: 1–3. https://doi.org/10.1109/SAHCN.2016.
7732965.
16 Int. j. inf. tecnol. (February 2021) 13(1):5–17
123
23. Sultana A, Geetalaxmi J (2019) A review of applications and
approaches of network monitoring. Int J Innov Res Comput Sci
Technol 7: 121–127. https://doi.org/10.21276/ijircst.2019.7.4.3.
24 Tsai P-W, Tsai C-W, Hsu C-W, Yang C-S (2018) Network
monitoring in software-defined networking: a review. IEEE Syst J.
https://doi.org/10.1109/JSYST.2018.2798060
25. Frunza, A, Rincu C, Jitaru A (2018) Remote network monitoring
using SDN based solutions: 301–304. https://doi.org/10.1109/
ICComm.2018.8430139
26. Shen S-H (2019) An efficient network monitor for SDN net-
works. ACM SIGMETRICS Perform Evaluat Rev 46:95–96.
https://doi.org/10.1145/3305218.3305255
27. Cushman W (2018) How real-time facility data monitoring saves
money. Available at: http://blog.qsifacilities.com/real-time-facil
ity-data [Accessed on 15th October 2019]
28. Yash P, (2017) How automating SOD controls monitoring, and
management strengthens compliance and security. Available at:
https://saviynt.com/blog/how-automating-sod-controls-monitor
ing-and-management-strengthens-compliance-and-security/ [Ac-
cessed on 15th October 2019]
29. Imperva (2019) Data loss prevention (DLP). Available at: https://
www.imperva.com/learn/data-security/data-loss-prevention-dlp/
[Accessed on 15th October 2019]
30. Ellen Z (2019) What is data loss prevention (DLP)? A definition
of data loss prevention. Available at: https://digitalguardian.com/
blog/what-data-loss-prevention-dlp-definition-data-loss-preven
tion [Accessed on 15th October 2019]
31. Ikuesan AR, Razak SA, Salleh M, Venter HS (2017) Leveraging
human thinking style for user attribution in digital forensic pro-
cess. Int J AdvSciEng Inform Technol 7(1):198–206
32. Makura SM, et al. (2020) Proactive forensics: keystroke logging
from the cloud as potential digital evidence for forensic readiness
purposes. In: 2020 IEEE International Conference on Informatics,
IoT, and Enabling Technologies (ICIoT), 200–205.
33. Ikuesan AR, Hein SV (2017) Digital forensic readiness frame-
work based on behavioral-biometrics for user attribution. In:
2017 IEEE conference on applications, information and network
security, AINS 2017, Miri, Malaysia: IEEE Comput. Soc, 54–59
34. Dougall M, Gallo S (2016) Achieving digital forensic readiness.
Available at: https://home.kpmg/au/en/home/insights/2016/10/
achieving-digital-forensic-readiness.html [Accessed on 16th
October 2019]
35. Pretorius S, Adeyemi RI, Hein SV (2018) Attributing users based
on web browser history. In: 2017 IEEE conference on applica-
tions, information and network security, AINS 2017, Miri,
Malaysia: IEEE Comput. Soc, 1–6
36. ACSC (2019) Fundamentals of cross domain solutions. Available
at: https://www.cyber.gov.au/publications/fundamentals-of-cross-
domain-solutions. [Accessed on 9th December 2019]
37. Bonakdarpour B, Deshmukh JV, Pajic M (2018) Opportunities
and challenges in monitoring cyber-physical systems security.
In: International Symposium on Leveraging Applications of
Formal Methods (pp. 9–18). Springer, Cham.
38. Lagrasse M, et al. (2020) Digital forensic readiness framework
for software-defined networks using a trigger-based collection
mechanism.’’ In: Proceedings of the 15th International Confer-
ence on Cyber Warfare and Security, ICCWS 2020, 296–305.
39. Munkhondya H, Adeyemi I, Hein V (2019) Digital forensic
readiness approach for potential evidence preservation in soft-
ware-defined networks. In: 14th International Conference on
Cyber Warfare and Security, ICCWS 2019, 268–76.
40. Munkhondya H, Adeyemi RI, Hein SV (2020) A case for a
dynamic approach to digital forensic readiness in an sdn platform.
In: Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Cyber
Warfare and Security, ICCWS 2020, 584–93.
41. Shu Z, Wan J, Lin J, Wang S, Li D, Rho S, Yang C (2016) Traffic
engineering in software-defined networking: Measurement and
management. IEEE Access 4:3246–3256
42. Queiroz W, Capretz MA, Dantas M (2019) An approach for SDN
traffic monitoring based on big data techniques. J NetwCom-
putAppl 131:28–39
43. Zhu B, Joseph A, Sastry S (2011) A taxonomy of cyber attacks on
SCADA systems. In: 2011 International conference on internet of
things and 4th international conference on cyber, physical and
social computing (pp. 380–388). IEEE.
44. Kebande VR, Karie NM, Wario RD, Venter HS (2018) forensic
profiling of cyber-security adversaries based on incident simi-
larity measures interaction index. In: 2018 International Confer-
ence on Intelligent and Innovative Computing Applications
(ICONIC) (pp. 1–6). IEEE.
45. Kebande VR, Venter HS (2018) Novel digital forensic readiness
technique in the cloud environment. Aust J ForenSci
50(5):552–591
46. Kebande VR, Venter HS (2018) On digital forensic readiness in
the cloud using a distributed agent-based solution: issues and
challenges. Aust J ForenSci 50(2):209–238
47. Kebande VR, Venter HS (2015) Adding event reconstruction to a
cloud forensic readiness model. In: 2015 Information Security for
South Africa (ISSA) (pp. 1–9). IEEE.
48. Kebande VR, Ray I (2016) A generic digital forensic investiga-
tion framework for internet of things (iot). In 2016 IEEE 4th
International Conference on Future Internet of Things and Cloud
(FiCloud) (pp. 356-362). IEEE.
Int. j. inf. tecnol. (February 2021) 13(1):5–17 17
123
